Date when decision was rendered: 30.8.1996

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3195; R-95/1455

Reference to source

KKO 1996:101.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1996 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1996 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1996 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1997

Pages: pp.518-520

Subject

fair trial, pretrial investigation, right to remain silent,
rättvis rättegång, förundersökning, rätt att avstå från att yttra sig,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, esitutkinta, oikeus pysyä vaiti,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 58 of the Road Traffic Act

= vägtrafiklagen 58 §

= tieliikennelaki 58 §.

ECHR-6-2, CCPR-14-3-g

Abstract

Section 58 of the Road Traffic Act obliges every driver involved in a traffic accident to stop and assist the injured.A had been involved in a traffic accident but neglected his obligations under section 58 of the Road Traffic Act.He claimed that he could not be punished for neglecting his obligations as stopping and assisting the injured at the scene of the accident would have placed him in a position where he himself could have been arrested and charged with drunken driving, among other things.This would violate A's right not to incriminate himself, which can be derived from the ECHR.

The Supreme Court stated that it does not follow from obeying section 58 of the Road Traffic Act that a crime suspect involved in a traffic accident would not have the same rights as everyone charged with a criminal offence is entitled to according to Article 14-3-g of the CCPR and Article 6-2 of the ECHR.A was sentenced for neglecting his obligations under section 58 of the Road Traffic Act.

Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal came to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court.The reasoning behind the decision of the court of first instance was the purpose of section 58 of the Road Traffic Act, which is to protect the life and health of victims of traffic accidents and which also contributes to the realisation of human rights.

30.3.1998 / 1.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 20.10.1997

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3527; R96/1271

Reference to source

KKO 1997:162.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1997 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1997 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1997 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1998

Pages: pp. 816-820

Subject

fair trial, pretrial investigation, preparation of defence,
rättvis rättegång, förundersökning, förberedande av försvar,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, esitutkinta, puolustuksen valmisteleminen,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 11, section 22-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 11 kapitel 22 § 2 mom.

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 11 luku 22 § 2 mom.

ECHR-6-3-a, CCPR-14-3-a

Abstract

A, B and C had been summoned before the court in a criminal case.The summons were served orally.The certificates of summons named the criminal offences A, B and C were charged with, the time and place of the offences, and the complainants.An indictment was not attached to the certificates of summons, but the accused were informed that they could obtain the indictment at the prosecutor's office.In the court of first instance, the accused asked that the charges be dismissed owing to the fact that the summons did not specify the facts upon which the charges were based.They referred to Article 6-3-a of the ECHR, Article 14-3-a of the CCPR and to Chapter 11, section 22-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.The court of first instance stated that the certificates of summons did not include a detailed description of the facts upon which the charges were based, as required by the Code of Judicial Procedure.An indictment or a short description of the facts of the alleged offences should have been delivered to the accused together with the summons.It was not enough that the accused were informed where the indictment could be obtained.The court of first instance concluded that the accused had not been summoned as required by the Code of Judicial Procedure and, therefore, dismissed the charges on procedural grounds.

Having appealed to the Turku Court of Appeal, which did not change the decision of the court of first instance, the prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court stated that the accused in a criminal case has a right to be informed promptly of the facts of the case and the alleged criminal act with which he is charged.However, this does not necessarily presuppose that the accused should receive the indictment at the moment when he is summoned.The accused person's right to have time to prepare for the case and for his defence can be secured by other means, such as by delivering the indictment to the accused before the case is taken up in court and, if need be, by postponing the court proceedings.According to Chapter 11, section 22-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the summons should include the facts upon which the charges are based.However, neither the law nor the case law define the criteria according to which an oral summons can be considered so incomplete that the charges should be dismissed on procedural grounds.By specifying the facts upon which the charges are based it is possible to limit the trial.Considering the purpose of the above-mentioned section of the Code, it can be said that the facts have been sufficiently specified when the accused has received sufficient information to be able to conclude which act or acts the charges concern.According to the report of the pretrial investigation proceedings, the accused in this case had during the questioning been informed of the criminal offences they were suspected of.They were also informed about the time and place of the offences, the complainants and the alleged criminal acts they were suspected of.The certificates of summons named the criminal offences the accused were charged with, the time and place of the offences as well as the complainants.Considering the pretrial investigation as a whole, the Supreme Court stated that there was no reason to doubt that A, B and C did not know, on the basis of the information in the certificate of summons, which acts they were charged with.Therefore the Supreme Court concluded that the accused had been summoned according to law and that the court of first instance and the Turku Court of Appeal should not have dismissed the charges on procedural grounds.The case was returned to the court of first instance and the court was ordered to start the proceedings against the accused.

A dissenting justice of the Supreme Court argued that the facts upon which the charges were based should have been specified in the summons.The duty to specify the facts is not dependent on the fact whether and to what extent the accused, in spite of the incomplete contents of the summons, knows which alleged criminal offence the summons concerns.It should be noted that the relevant provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure providing, among other things, for the possibility of presenting the summons orally, were abolished by the Act Amending the Code of Judicial Procedure (690/1990).The Act entered into force on 1 October 1997.

2.4.1998 / 4.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 10.4.2013

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 817

Reference to source

KKO 2013:25.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2013 January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2013 januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2013 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2013

Pages: pp. 205-210

Subject

fair trial, self-incrimination, pretrial investigation, preparation of defence, legal counsel,
rättvis rättegång, utsätta sig för åtal, förundersökning, förberedande av försvar, rättegångsbiträde,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, saattaa itsensä syytteen vaaraan, esitutkinta, puolustuksen valmisteleminen, oikeudenkäyntiavustaja,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 10, 29 and 30 of the Criminal Investigations Act; Chapter 17, sections 2, 4 and 32 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; Chapter 2, section 1 and Chapter 6, section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act

= förundersökningslagen 10 §, 29 § och 30 §; rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 2 §, 4 § och 32 §; lag om rättegång i brottmål 2 kapitel 1 § och 6 kapitel 7 §

= esitutkintalaki 10 §, 29 § ja 30 §; oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 2 §, 4 § ja 32 §; laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa 2 luku 1 § ja 6 luku 7 §.

ECHR-6-3-c; CCPR-14-3-d

Abstract

The court of first instance had sentenced X to imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs with intent to sell.The court of appeal had increased the punishment, because in the appeal court's view it had been shown that X had also sold drugs.As grounds for its decision the court of appeal referred to three statements X had given when being questioned in the pretrial investigation.X had later retracted these statements during the court proceedings.The appeal court did not regard X's statement in court as plausible.X appealed to the Supreme Court.

The main question before the Supreme Court was whether X's right to legal assistance in the pretrial investigation and the privilege against self-incrimination had been breached to the effect that the pretrial investigation statements could not be used as evidence against X.In addition to the relevant national legislation, the Supreme Court referred to the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the right to legal assistance and waiver of legal assistance (Salduz v Turkey, judgment of 27 November 2008; Panovits v Cyprus, judgment of 11 December 2008; Yoldas v Turkey, judgment of 23 February 2010; Brusco v France, judgment of 14 October 2010; and Leonid Lazarenko v Ukraine, judgment of 28 October 2010).

According to the pretrial investigation records, X had been informed before the first questioning of his position in the investigation, his right to request the presence of a credible witness, the specific offence in which he was suspected, his right to retain counsel in the investigation, and of in which situations a public defender may be assigned to him.On the following two occasions of questioning X had, according to the pretrial investigation records, said he does not need legal counsel or a credible witness.X had inspected and signed the pretrial investigation records.X had not claimed that he would have requested the presence of legal counsel or a credible witness in the pretrial investigation, nor had he referred to the privilege against self-incrimination.The Supreme Court found nothing which would have suggested that X would not have known in which offence he was suspected or that X would not have appreciated the consequences of waiving the right to legal counsel and a credible witness, or that persuasion, coercion or other improper methods would have been used in order to make X tell things that were to his disadvantage.The Supreme Court concluded that the waiver of legal counsel and a credible witness could under the circumstances be established in an unequivocal manner.X's rights in the pretrial investigation had thus not been breached to the effect that the pretrial investigation statements could not have been used as evidence against him.

The Supreme Court pointed out that there were no legal provisions concerning the value as evidence of a suspect's confession at the pretrial investigation stage.The court had considered this question in its earlier decision KKO 2000:35 of 20 March 2000, in which case the court had concluded that although a retracted confession could be used as evidence, it is clear that a pretrial investigation statement which is later retracted by the suspect in the court proceedings cannot be the sole or mail basis for a conviction.The Supreme Court found that in the instant case, other evidence presented by the prosecutor, in addition to the pretrial investigation statements, did not explicitly show that X had also sold drugs.Rather, as the court of first instance had found, evidence showed that X had been guilty of possession of drugs with intent to sell.The pretrial investigation statements, which had later been retracted, were thus the main evidence to show that X had been quilty of selling drugs.A conviction cannot be based on such evidence alone.Other evidence presented in the case was not sufficient to support conviction.The Supreme Court ruled that the charges for selling drugs were to be dismissed as unsubstantiated.

23.9.2014 / 29.5.2017 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 9.5.2012

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 861; R2011/704

Reference to source

KKO 2012:45.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2012 January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2012 januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2012 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2012

Pages: 296-310

Subject

fair trial, preparation of defence, self-incrimination, legal counsel, pretrial investigation, interpretation,
rättvis rättegång, förberedande av försvar, utsätta sig för åtal, rättegångsbiträde, förundersökning, tolkning,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, puolustuksen valmisteleminen, saattaa itsensä syytteen vaaraan, oikeudenkäyntiavustaja, esitutkinta, tulkkaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 17, section 32 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; Chapter 6, section 7-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act; sections 10, 29, 37 and 39 of the Criminal Investigations Act

= rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 32 §; lag om rättegång i brottmål 6 kapitel 7 § 2 mom.; förundersökningslagen 10 §, 29 §, 37 § och 39 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 32 §; laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa 6 luku 7 § 2 mom.; esitutkintalaki 10 §, 29 §, 37 § ja 39 §.

ECHR-6-3-c; ECHR-6-3-e

Abstract

X had been in custody when being questioned by the police on suspicion of an aggravated narcotics offence.X had been appointed a defender who, however, was not present during the questioning.X did not speak Finnish, so the language used in questioning was English.The official record of the questioning was prepared in Finnish, and the police officer had given X an oral translation of the record in English.According to the pretrial investigation records, X had been informed by the police before the questioning of his right to counsel, but not of his right to remain silent and his right not to incriminate himself.The police had been aware that X had not consulted his counsel before the questioning.In the court of appeal, X was convicted for aggravated narcotics offence, grossly negligent homicide and grossly negligent bodily injury.The conviction was partly based on X's pretrial investigation statements which the prosecutor had referred to as evidence supporting X's guilt.

The Supreme Court found that, despite the evidence received in the oral hearing before the Supreme Court, it was not clear why X had failed to meet with his counsel.Apparently, counsel should have provided more effective assistance.On the other hand, the police had not notified him in advance as to when exactly X's questioning would take place.The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a defender for X or the fact that X had continued to answer questions in the absence of his counsel did not relieve the authorities from their duty to guarantee the suspect's rights of defence.Such guarantees must be practical and effective.The mere appointment of a defender is not necessarily sufficient.The Supreme Court concluded that X could not be regarded as having waived his right to counsel at the pretrial investigation stage in a knowing and unequivocal manner, as established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.Nor could X be regarded as having been fully aware of the offences he was suspected in or what the legal consequences of the waiver would be.As far as the working language of the questioning was concerned, the Supreme Court ruled that questioning X in English had not as such been in breach of X's rights.However, preparing the record of the questioning in Finnish, when the questioning had in fact been in English, was not in accordance with the Criminal Investigations Act.X had not been able to himself review the contents of the record of the questioning before signing it.

The Supreme Court concluded that there had been a breach of X's rights of defence and his right not to incriminate himself to the effect that X's statements in the pretrial investigation could not be used as evidence against him.In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed in detail the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on guarantees of a fair trial at the pretrial investigation stage, the waiver of the right to legal counsel and the minimum safeguards required in such a case.

1.10.2014 / 1.10.2014 / RHANSKI